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Abstract
This paper explores how different credit market- and banking regulations affect business
fluctuations. Capital adequacy- and reserve requirements are analysed for their effect on the
risk of severe downturns. We develop an agent-based macroeconomic model in which finan-
cial contagion is transmitted through balance sheets in an endogenous firm-bank network,
that incorporates firm bankruptcy and heterogeneity among banks to capture the fact that
contagion effects are bank-specific. Using concepts from the empirical literature to identify
amplitude and duration of recessions and expansions we show that more stringent liquidity
regulations are best to dampen output fluctuations and prevent severe downturns. Under
such regulations both leverage along expansions and amplitude of recessions become smaller.
More stringent capital requirements induce larger output fluctuations and lead to deeper,
more fragile recessions. This indicates that the capital adequacy requirement is pro-cyclical
and therefore not advisable as a measure to prevent financial contagion.
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1 Introduction
The agenda of this paper is to improve our understanding of the mechanisms responsible for
business fluctuations and to explore how the amplitude of such fluctuations is affected by dif-
ferent types of banking- and credit market regulations. It is well documented that business
fluctuations are associated to substantial welfare costs (see e.g. Gali et al., 2007) and these costs
are particularly severe for deep recessions. Such severe downturns are typically associated with
massive job losses and firm bankruptcies, which induce a substantial reduction in physical and
human capital, thereby negatively affecting not only current output but also growth perspec-
tives (see e.g. Verho (2008) or Berkmen et al. (2009) for treatments of the potentially negative
long-term effects of recessions). As many historical examples show, severe recessions also induce
an increased danger of political instability and the erosion of trust in valuable economic insti-
tutions, as witnessed for example by the bank runs and subsequent banking panic during the
Great Depression. But also more recently, the anti-austerity demonstrations across Europe are
showing a growing political divide.
Hence, avoiding deep recessions is a particularly urgent goal for economic policy makers,
apart from the overall objective of smoothing the business cycle. Whereas a large body of liter-
ature addresses the issue of business cycle smoothing, only a small part of this work explicitly
addresses the impact of different policy measures on the lower part of the distribution of down-
turns, i.e. on the severity of the strongest downturns that might occur under different policy
scenarios.
This paper focuses exactly on this aspect of business cycle fluctuations and explores to what
extent more stringent regulations are suitable tools to avoid severe downturns in an economy.
The analysis is carried out in the context of an agent-based macroeconomic model with a strong
focus on the firm’s financial management and the banking sector. The main part of the model
is a credit market embedded in a full-fledged macroeconomic setting with a fully functioning
production sector for consumption goods, a labour market, and a market for investment goods
(see Fig.1 for an illustration of the model). In the analysis we include feedback effects from the
real sector to the banking sector that might attenuate or exacerbate the pro-cyclicality of the
credit and banking regulation. The real sector endogenously generates expansions and recessions,
which allows to test whether in scenarios with more restrictive capital- or reserve requirements
we obtain statistically significant differences in the amplitude and duration of recessions.
In the aftermath of the recent 2007-09 financial and economic crisis a large body of literature
has emerged which aims to capture the feedback effects between financial and real cycles. We
contribute to this literature by developing and exploiting a model which endogenously generates
cycles in the spirit of Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis (see Minsky, 1978, 1986) and
captures the main properties of leverage cycles, as described e.g. in Geanakoplos (2009).
The framework is based on a taxonomy of firms into financially sound (healthy) firms versus
financially unsound (unhealthy) firms. This dichotomy is based on the Minskyan notion that a
firm may be in a financial position that is characterized as hedge finance, speculative finance, or
Ponzi finance. This classifies firms according to their financial fragility and is therefore directly
related to their risk of insolvency. The persistent financial heterogeneity of both banks and firms
are the outcome of a dynamic process involving two financial contagion mechanisms, a balance
sheet mechanism and a bank lending mechanism.
The balance sheet mechanism works through the balance sheet of the firm. The firm’s
financial robustness determines its default risk and its credit worthiness. ’Good’ healthy firms
are able to secure credit if the bank has sufficient amounts of liquidity available, whereas ’bad’
unhealthy firms are likely to be credit rationed. If the ’bad’ firms default on their loans this
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affects the balance sheets of the banks through a write-off of bad debt on a fraction of the loans.
If this happens, the bank’s equity declines and so does its willingness to lend to other firms. The
contagion effect consists in the effect that all other firms, sound or unsound, now find it more
difficult to secure a loan.
The bank lending mechanism depends on the excess liquidity available to the bank. Since
liquidity is endogenously determined by deposits and withdrawals by firms and households, the
bank will restrict lending when it approaches the minimum reserve ratio (a policy parameter).
The contagion effect results from the fact that if a firm with a large liquidity demand has
obtained a loan this will restrict the bank’s available liquidity and limit the credit supply to all
other firms. Regardless of whether the other firms are healthy or risky, they are now more likely
to be credit rationed.
Credit market and banking regulations are affecting the magnitude of the two contagion
mechanisms. First, changing the minimum Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) affects the bank
lending mechanism.1 A more restrictive reserve ratio makes banks less willing to lend and
therefore credit rationing becomes more likely.
Second, the Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR, or minimum base capital requirement)
affects the balance sheet mechanism. A weak capital regulation allows banks to increase their
risk exposure and therefore strengthens the financial contagion effect. The contagion does not
only apply to firms but also to banks. A higher credit supply to ’bad’ firms implies that if they
default the bad debt will be higher resulting in other banks to bear the brunt of having to write
off bad debts as well.
The question how macroeconomic outcomes are affected by these credit regulations evolves
around the well-known trade-off between output growth and aggregate volatility. Loose, non-
restrictive regulations tend to lead to higher leverage ratios of both firms and banks. As a
consequence, this results in higher growth rates but also leads to more volatility.
On the other hand, more stringent capital requirements restrict banks’ risk-taking behaviour,
resulting in the most risky firms to be credit rationed. A very lax capital requirement allows even
the most highly leveraged firms to obtain loans, but now the bank’s liquidity reserve requirement
could become binding. If the liquidity constraint is tight, this constraint will ensure financial
stability. However, it might also lead to reduced economic growth as the riskier firms now find
themselves cut off from liquidity. Hence, there exists a trade-off between growth and stability.
Furthermore, if both constraints are non-restrictive or lax, the banking sector is allowed to
provide a lot of liquidity to the real sector, leading to over-investments in production capacity
that are characteristic of a financially fragile boom phase (see, e.g., Delli Gatti and Gallegati,
1992). This excess production capacity temporarily leads to higher output levels, but on the
long run can turn out to be detrimental to financial stability. It should therefore be anticipated
that if requirements on reserves and core capital are weak, the risk for severe downturns is
particularly large.
Another effect of the non-restrictive, lax liquidity requirements is that this encourages over-
leveraging by the banks, the supply of new loans is high, and the bank takes on more risk.
They continue to supply new credit to large firms in order to roll-over their debts, crowding out
the credit requests of smaller firms that may become illiquid as a result. These illiquidities of
healthy firms signals an inefficient allocation of credit resulting from a ”congestion” effect on the
credit market. Instead, in a scenario with a more restrictive reserve requirement the unhealthy
firms with large credit requests are credit rationed much sooner and become insolvent, while the
smaller healthier firms obtain the liquidity they need to produce. The insolvencies indicate that
banks are letting the unsound firms exit the market instead of supporting them and crowding
out the smaller, healthier firms.
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Summarizing, it seems that a prudent regulatory policy should strike a balance between
allowing banks to provide a sufficient amount of liquidity to any firm that needs it for productive
purposes (the safe, healthy, and financially sound firms), while at the same time it should prevent
banks from re-financing the debts of firms that already have a very high leverage ratio.
A main insight from our analysis is that a tightening of the credit and banking regulations has
effects on the most severe downturns (the lower part of the distribution of recession amplitudes),
but these effects differ qualitatively between the capital adequacy and the reserve requirement,
resp. In particular, strengthening the capital requirement leads to an increase in the amplitude
of the worst downturns, whereas more stringent liquidity constraints induce a reduction of the
amplitude of recessions in the lower part of the distribution. Furthermore, these effects appear
in a range of regulatory parameters where the median amplitude of recessions is not significantly
affected by either of the two variations of the regulatory scheme. Hence, this result is different
from a blanket stabilization policy that focusses on smoothing the business cycle, and specifically
affects the most severe recessions.
The agent-based approach employed in our analysis allows us to identify in detail the micro-
level mechanisms that are responsible for these different implications of the two considered
regulatory schemes. Based on this analysis, we will obtain a clear intuition about their potential
effects on the economic fluctuations and the risks for severe downturns.
The insights obtained by our analysis have clear policy implications since the considered
regulatory schemes are at the core of the Basel II/III framework. An argument against the
Basel II capital requirements is that they are pro-cyclical. During a downturn the probability
of default and hence the probability of loan losses increases. This leads to higher demand for
collateral and reduces the available capital buffers of banks. The reduction of the capital buffers
limits the banks’ capacity to lend in the future and reduces the overall supply of credit, thereby
reducing investments and further exacerbating the downturn. These mechanisms are at the
centre of theories of financial instability, such as the Leverage Cycle (Geanakoplos, 2009) and
the Financial Instability Hypothesis (Minsky, 1978). Our results shed light on the question as
to how relevant such mechanisms are in a macroeconomic setting and provide some guidance
how additional regulatory measures might dampen or even amplify such an effect.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss different
streams of relevant literature. The model is presented in Section 3 and in Section 4 we summarize
the main results concerning the effects of two scenarios, namely a tighter capital adequacy
requirement and a tighter reserve requirement. The scenarios illustrate the various mechanisms
we described above in the introduction, for a multitude of parametrizations of the model. The
results of these two scenarios are then compared to the results of a baseline scenario. Finally,
in Section 5 we conclude and offer some suggestions for further research.
Policy response to the 2007-8 financial crisis in the U.S. and in Europe
The policy response by the U.S. Government and the FED to the Global Financial Crisis
consisted of a mixture of fiscal and monetary policy measures. It included a bank rescue package
(the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) in 2008), a fiscal stimulus package, and the FED
initiated Quantitative Easing starting from November 2008.
There are mixed reports on the success of the Quantitative Easing policy and its monetary
policy effectiveness. The assessments about the impact of the Federal Reserve’s large-scale
asset purchases (LSAPs) range from ”LSAPs played a significant role in supporting economic
activity”2 to ”the expansion of assets has had very little impact on the economy.”3
An argument against QE is that it side-steps the main goal of the policy itself, which is
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to stimulate the economy and generate consumer price inflation. Instead, it appears to merely
cause asset price bubbles, and thereby becomes self-defeating.
As a positive side-effect, QE-1 (Nov. 2008) is credited as a prime factor for the bottoming-
out of the 2008 recession in the second half of 2009. And QE-2 (Nov. 2010) is widely believed
to have led to a rise in the stock market at the end of 2010, which contributed to an increase in
consumption and thereby stimulated economic activity.
As a negative side-effect, QE can fail to spur demand if banks remain reluctant to lend money
to businesses and households. The QE policy is also widely believed to have led to an increase
in the income and wealth inequality due to the effect it has on financial markets causing asset
price inflation.
It has become clear by now that QE causes a reverse ‘flight to quality’, which could be called
a ‘flight to quantity’, due to the low yields on T-Bills resulting from the policy. Whereas a flight
to quality implies that investors seek less risk in exchange for lower profits, and therefore shift
from private assets to government backed securities, during a flight to quantity institutional
investors such as pension funds are seeking more risk in order to obtain higher returns. They
move away from government bonds towards other, higher-yield investments. By driving up the
price of firm stocks, this has contributed to an appreciation of asset market valuations, resulting
in a reduction of systemic risks by bolstering the balance sheets of the banks.
In Europe the policy response has been less forthcoming. The ECB started Quantitative
Easing only in January 2015, by initiating a programme to purchase Eur 60bn per month of
Euro area bonds from Euro area institutions (estimated total costs of 1.1 trillion Euro). The
stated policy goal of the Eurozone’s QE policy is to return to inflation rates below but close to
2 percent. To this end, the threat of deflation across the Eurozone let Mr. Draghi to announce
that the programme will continue ”until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation.”4
However, at the same time he announced that ”What monetary policy can do is to create the
basis for growth, but for growth to pick up, you need investment.” (ibid.)
Hence, on the fiscal policy side, the European Commission and the European Investment
Bank initiated the Investment Plan for Europe, and launched the European Fund for Strategic
Investments (EFSI). The stated policy goal of this fund is that ”Initial funding of Eur 21bn
should result in total investment in strategic projects of at least Eur 315bn over the period
2015-2017 thanks to the Fund’s potential to mobilise private investment.”5 Thus, a main driver
of this policy is the commitment to a belief that public investment will lead to a crowding-in of
private investments.
2 Related literature
Our analysis is related to several streams of literature that discuss the linkages between real
and financial cycles, the design of stabilization policies as well as the effects of credit market
and banking regulations. Below we briefly review the work that is most closely related to our
research agenda and methodological approach.
Business and financial cycles; Financial Instability Hypothesis
Empirical studies on how business cycles and financial cycles are interrelated find that re-
cessions after a financial crisis tend to be longer and deeper than other recessions (Claessens
et al., 2011). Schularick and Taylor (2012) find that a one standard deviation increase in the
real growth rate of total private sector debt is associated to an increase in the probability of a
financial crisis by approximately 2.8 percentage points.
6
This evidence suggests that the duration and costs of recessions are determined by the
interplay between financial and real variables that tend to be amplified through a financial
accelerator mechanism. The presence of a financial accelerator opens up the possibility of
fluctuations to be transmitted through the balance sheets of firms, households and banks.
We use these findings to investigate whether in our model there are similar relationships be-
tween the fluctuations in the credit market and the aggregate real variables. We then relate these
to the strength of policy parameters of the credit regulations to investigate whether stronger
credit regulations lead to shorter and more shallow recessions. From a social welfare perspective,
the estimated costs of recessions will determine whether strong or weak credit regulations are
preferable.
Other empirical studies go beyond viewing the credit market as a mere financial accelerator,
and consider credit as an endogenous source of financial disturbances. This is in line with scholars
such as Minsky (1978) and Kindleberger (2000) who view endogenously created credit bubbles
and the accompanying increase in leverage as a cause of economic instability. Measuring leverage
trends along the business cycles may then be a way to monitor the heightening risk of financial
crises. In empirical testing of the Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), Schularick and Taylor
(2012) find that lagged credit growth is the best predictor for future financial instability. This
result thus supports the FIH in that a credit bubble is a precursor to instability.
Using data for 14 countries the authors find several trends for the post-WWII era (1945-
2008). The data show an increase in financial instability is mainly caused by three factors: (i)
expansion of the role of credit, (ii) higher leverage of banks’ balance sheets, and (iii) increased
policy intervention preventing a periodic deleveraging.
The first trend is that since 1945 bank loans have increased strongly relative to GDP, and
relative to broad money (M2 or M3). The loan-money ratio grew by 2.19 percent per year
indicating a much stronger dependence on bank credit in the economy.
A second trend is the increased leveraging evidenced by a shift to more risky assets on the
balance sheets of banks. The proportion of safe, liquid, low-yield assets has been reduced in
favour of more riskier, high-return assets. Since the safe assets can serve as a buffer to financial
shocks in ”bad times”, this shift has weakened the banks’ ability to withstand shocks.
The third and final trend is policy intervention. Due to the lessons learned during the Great
Depression policy-makers have been more prone to act in financial crises. This has prevented
a periodic deleveraging of the financial sector during the post-WWII period, and has implicitly
allowed a growth of leverage to occur up to the financial crisis of 2007-8.
Credit market regulations
The new Basel III banking regulation calls for a 4.5 to 7 percent ratio of core equity tier-1
capital (CET1) to risk-weighted-assets, to be phased-in by 2019 (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2013). This long gestation period is to ensure there are no shocks due to a sudden
change in regulation. According to Admati and Hellwig (2013) this capital requirement is much
too weak, and focusses attention on the wrong issues. They argue that banking regulation is now
targeted at banks’ assets, while it should be focussed on the banks’ liabilities. In particular,
banks should have more capital (a lot more) and less short-term debt. More capital would
stabilize the financial system and prevent the large overhangs of short-term debt that now are
causing fire sales of assets in the case of a liquidity crisis. One of the main problems they see is
that bank debt is guaranteed by government, which provides the wrong incentives to banks to
increase their risk-exposure and to run up their leverage ratios. The capital ratios that Admati
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and Hellwig advocate are more in the range of 20 to 30 percent of non-risk weighted assets, which
stands in stark contrast to the current 4.5 percent of risk-weighted assets in Basel II and the
future 7 percent in Basel III. Such high capital ratios are also not without historical precedent
since in the 19th century banks funded themselves with 40 to 50 percent capital. Note however
that other authors (cf., Calomiris, 2013) have pointed out that such historical comparisons
are not entirely unproblematic since banks’ equity ratios have changed dramatically over time,
and a comparison should take into account the asset risks, as well changes in institutional
arrangements. For instance, in the 19th and early 20th century banks did not have access to
deposit insurance or a safety net such as tax-funded bail-outs.
A related argument deals with the positive impact that very strict banking regulations might
have on aggregate economic outcomes. If banks are forced to create buffer stocks of capital, by
so called dynamic loan loss provisioning, this ensures the supply of credit also during times of
duress so it will stabilize aggregate output fluctuations.
A third argument considers the social costs of banking crises. A potential counter-argument
against higher capital requirements is that this would be very costly and it would reduce the
supply of funds available to lend to firms. Admati and Hellwig argue against this, by showing
that the private costs for the banks of having sufficient amounts of equity are much smaller
than the social costs of taxpayer-funded bail-out programmes. Also, if banks were to have more
capital this does not reduce the funds available for lending in any way since it improves the
confidence of the general public in the banking system as a whole and thereby contributes to
financial system stability.
Credit networks and interbank markets
Particular emphasis on the role of credit markets for aggregate fluctuations is given in Delli
Gatti et al. (2003, 2008) and Delli Gatti et al. (2011). An important aspect of their models is
that they capture the linkages based on credit relationships between firms and banks, among
firms in trade networks, and among banks in inter-bank networks. These properties allow to
gain important insights into relevant mechanisms responsible for contagion effects and to explore
implications of different types of bank and credit market regulations.
Ashraf et al. (2011) also explore the effects of different banking regulations, in a model of
shop owners where market interactions are governed by search and matching processes. They
study the role of banks both in normal times and in times of crises.
Krug et al. (2014) study the impact of the proposed Basel III regulations in an agent-based
model with credit networks. They find that the positive joint impact of several microprudential
policies to the resilience of the financial system is larger than the sum of the individual effects
measured in isolation, that is, the effects of the policies are non-additive. This makes the
important point that policies should be considered in unison, and it is important to study
whether policies are mutually enhancing or detracting.
Agent-based macroeconomics
A number of recent contributions to the literature have developed closed macroeconomic
models using an agent-based approach (e.g. Mandel et al., 2010; Dawid et al., 2014, 2015;
Dosi et al., 2010, 2013, 2015). These models incorporate heterogeneity of different agent types
(households, firms, banks) along various relevant dimensions (skill levels, capital stocks, financial
variables). Furthermore, the behaviour of the agents is modeled with recourse to strong empirical
foundations. As discussed extensively e.g. in Dawid et al. (2015) and Dosi et al. (2015), many
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of these models are able to replicate a large set of stylized facts at different levels of aggregation,
and can be used to highlight the economic processes that generate these fluctuations. Agent-
based macroeconomic models have a number of advantages over more standard macro models.
Particularly relevant to our purpose is the notion that agent-based models are able to produce
self-sustaining business cycle fluctuations by relying on the endogenous generation of shocks at
the microlevel. This stands in stark contrast to many standard macroeconomic models, such as
Real Business Cycle models and Neo-Keynesian models, which require a continuous stream of
exogenous shocks to produce business fluctuations.
Several of the agent-based macroeconomic papers cited above focus on policy issues and
highlight the advantages of an agent-based approach in this respect. In particular, considering
the dynamics of the key variables of the different agents at the micro level allows to study in
detail the mechanisms responsible for the short-run and long-run effects of policies and regulatory
measures.
3 The Model
3.1 Overall Structure
The model describes an economy containing labour, consumption goods, capital goods, financial
and credit markets. The economy is inhabited by numerous instances of different types of
agents: firms (consumption goods producers and capital goods producers), households and
banks. Additionally, there is a single central bank and a government that collects taxes and
finances social benefits as well as potentially some economic policy measures. Finally, there
is a statistical office (Eurostat) that collects data from all individual agents in the economy
and generates aggregate indicators according to standard procedures. These indicators are
distributed to the agents in the economy who might use them as input to their decision rules,
and are also stored in order to facilitate the analysis of the simulation results. A graphical
overview over the crucial parts of the model is given in Figure 1.
[ADD FIGURE 1: ”EuraceUnibi Model” ABOUT HERE]
Capital goods of different quality are provided by capital goods producers with infinite
supply. The technological frontier (i.e. the quality of the best currently available capital good)
improves over time, where technological change is driven by a stochastic (innovation) process.
Firms in the consumption goods sector use capital goods combined with labour input to produce
consumption goods. Consumption goods are sold at local market platforms (called malls), where
firms store and offer their products and consumers come to buy goods at posted prices. Labour
market interaction is described by a simple multi-round search-and-matching procedure where
firms post vacancies, searching employees apply, firms make offers and employees accept/reject.
Wages of employees are determined, on the one hand, by the expectation the employer has at
the time of hiring about the level of specific skills of the employee, and, on the other hand,
by a base wage variable, which is influenced by the (past) tightness of the labour market and
determines the overall level of wages paid by a particular employer. Banks collect deposits from
households and firms and give credits to firms. The interest firms pay depends on the financial
situation of the firm. The amount of the loan might be restricted by the bank’s liquidity and
risk exposure. In case a bank is illiquid the central bank provides standing facilities through its
discount window at a given base rate. It also pays interest on the banks’ overnight deposits and
might provide fiat money to the government.
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Finally, there is a financial market where shares of a single asset are traded, namely an
index bond in which all firms in the economy participate (banks, consumption goods firms and
investment goods firms). The dividends paid on each share of the index bond at a certain point
in time is determined by the total dividends paid by all firms. This simple representation of a
financial market is meant as a generating mechanism for an asymmetric wealth distribution. It
captures the important feedback from firm profits to households’ wealth, where the fluctuations
in dividends only affect the wealth of households owning shares.
Since the focus of this paper is on credit market regulation, more detail on the credit market
is given in the next sections. More extensive model specifications for the other markets can be
found in (Dawid et al., 2011b, 2012).
3.2 Firm sequence of activities
Each firm proceeds through the following sequence of economic activities:
1. On the firm’s idiosyncratic activation day the firm starts its production cycle with pro-
duction planning. The production plan consists of planned output based on historical
observations and the results of market research. Based on the production plan the firm
determines its planned input demand for capital and labour.
2. Financial management of the firm. The firm computes the costs of production and the
costs for financing its commitments. If the internal resources are insufficient the firm tries
to finance externally by requesting credit.
3. Credit market with direct firm bank linkages opens. The banks provide credit by servicing
the loan request on a first come first serve basis. The bank decides on the credit conditions
for the applying firm (interest rate and amount of credit provided) depending on the firm’s
financial situation. If the credit request is refused, or not fully accepted, the firm has to
reduce its planned production quantity.
4. Bankruptcy of two types could occur. If the firm is credit constrained to such extent that it
is not able to pay the financial commitments it becomes illiquid and illiquidity bankruptcy
is declared. If at the end of the production cycle revenues are so low that the firm has
negative net worth, the firm is insolvent and insolvency bankruptcy is declared. In both
cases it goes out of business, stops all productive activities and all employees loose their
jobs. The firm writes off a fraction of its debt with all banks with which it has a loan and
stays idle for a certain period before it becomes active again.
5. Capital goods market opens. Depending on the amount of financing secured by the firm,
it makes physical capital investments. This consists of a vintage choice where the produc-
tivity of the capital stock is updated if new vintages are installed.
6. A decentralized labour market opens where firms with open vacancies are matched to un-
employed households. The matching is based on the firm’s wage offer and on the employee’s
skill level and reservation wage.
7. Production takes place on the firm’s activation day. After production is completed, the
output is distributed to local malls. Firms offer goods at posted prices with price revisions
occurring once a year.
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8. At the end of the production cycle the firm computes its revenues, and updates its income
statement and balance sheet. It pays taxes, dividends, interests and debt installments. It
checks if net worth is negative and if so, declares bankruptcy. Otherwise it continues with
the next production cycle.
3.3 Consumption goods sector
Consumption goods are produced by the firms once in a month on their activation day. The
activation days of firms are asynchronously distributed over the month. The consumption goods
are homogeneous regarding quality, but horizontally differentiated and heterogeneous in prices.
Each firm conducts a detailed production planning containing the calculation of the vertically
differentiated input factors capital and labour. Planned production quantities and prices are
determined by using estimated residual demand curves obtained from simulated purchase surveys
on a test market. In particular, firms set planned production quantities and prices in order to
maximize the expected discounted profits over their planing horizon taking into account the
estimated marginal costs and the elasticity of demand. Firms store the produced goods in a
mall. Each household visits the mall once a week but not all households visit the mall on the
same day of the week. They spend their consumption budget in order to purchase consumption
goods. Since the consumption goods are homogeneous regarding the quality but heterogeneous
in price, less expensive goods are more likely to be chosen. The decision which good to buy
is described using a logit-choice model with a strong empirical foundation in the marketing
literature (see e.g. Malhotra, 1984). The parameter γ determining the strength of the influence
of prices on the consumers product choice is a crucial model parameter in this respect. A
large value of γ corresponds to strong price sensitivity of consumers, which implies intensive
competition between the consumption good producers. As will be discussed below, such strong
competition induces more unstable and volatile economic dynamics compared to a scenario with
smaller γ, where firms have more market power and on average gain higher profits.
Employees are heterogeneous in their general skill levels (general education) and an endoge-
nously evolving specific skill level (job-related knowledge). The specific skill level depends on
the technology in use by the firm they work for. The specific skills increase over time during
the production process through learning on-the-job and investments in new technology vintages
by the firm impute a new learning phase. Employees learn, that is, improve their specific skill
levels, by using the current machinery in the firm (see e.g. Argote and Epple, 1990). The speed
of learning depends positively on the general skill level of the employee, and learning only occurs
when the productivity of the machinery exceeds the specific skill level of that employee, thus
closing the so called skill-gap.
The production technology in the consumption goods sector is represented by a Leontief
production function in which the input factors are used in fixed proportion: one unit of capital
is used by one employee. There is complementarity between the productivity of the inputs,
that is, the average productivity of the mix of capital vintages currently in use by the firm
and the average specific skills of the employees currently employed by the firm. The effective
productivity of one unit of capital is the minimum of the productivity of the physical capital
and the average productivity of labour.
3.4 Investment goods sector
Investment goods6 are produced by one investment goods producer. The investment goods pro-
ducer offers different vintages of the investment good with different qualities on every day. The
supply of each vintage is infinite. In order to simplify the model at this point it is assumed
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that the investment goods producer is able to produce without any input factors. The intro-
duction time of new vintages with improved quality (higher productivity) follows an exogenous
stochastic process. The quality of a machine determines the maximal productivity when used
by employees with sufficiently high specific skills. The investment goods producer expands the
set of vintages on offer as soon as a new vintage becomes available. Prices for the vintages are
determined by the investment goods producer using a combination of a cost-based approach
and a value-based approach. In order to close the model the revenues of the investment goods
producer are paid out as dividends to the households.
Consumption goods producers need investment goods as an input factor to their production
process. They select a vintage from the list if they want to expand or replace their capital stock.
To make a vintage choice firms estimate the costs and expected future benefits of the different
vintages over their planning horizon, depending on the skill distribution of their workforce. The
probability to select a certain vintage is then determined by a logit model based on the ratio of
the benefit and the costs of each vintage.
3.5 Labour market
The labour demand is solely determined by the consumption goods producers. If a firm reduces
its output a corresponding number of employees are dismissed such that the new workforce
matches the planned output. In case of an expansion of production the firm posts vacancies
that contain wage offers. If the firm cannot fill all of its vacancies due to a tight labour market or
due to search frictions, it increases the wage offer to attract more employees. Only unemployed
households search for jobs, so there is no on-the-job search. An unemployed household searches
actively on average on two randomly chosen days per month. She considers the wage offers
of a randomly chosen subset of firms that have posted vacancies and compares these to her
reservation wage. If the wage offer exceeds her reservation wage she sends in an application.
The maximum number of applications per person per month is fixed exogenously.
For the firm, if the number of applicants is below the number of vacancies, the firm sends
job offers to all applicants. If the number of applicants exceeds the number of vacancies the firm
sends job offers to as many applicants as there are vacancies to fill. Firms prefer applicants with
higher general skills. Every unemployed household ranks the incoming job offers according to
the wage offer and the highest ranked job offer is accepted. This algorithm is aborted after two
iterations, which implies that not all firms necessarily may fill all their vacancies and/or not all
unemployed households find a job. This implies labour market frictions and a possible rationing
of firms. In addition, in each period any employment relationship can be dissolved at random
with some small constant probability such that a certain rate of labour turnover is ensured even
in the absence of output adjustments by the firms.
3.6 Financial management
At the end of each production cycle (one month) the firm computes its income statement to
determine its profits. Table 1 shows the balance sheet of the firm. The realized profit of a
consumption goods producer equals the sales revenues plus interest received on bank deposits
minus the production costs (fixed and variable costs). Hence, pii,t is determined at the end of
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month t as:
pii,t = Ri,t + r
bMi,t − (CFixi,t + CV ari,t )
= Ri,t + r
bMi,t −
 TL∑
l=1
pinvt−l · It−l
TL
+
TL∑
l=0
rbi,t−lL
b
i,t−l
− (Wi,t + pinvt · It
TL
)
. (1)
The fixed costs are the fixed capital expenditures over the previous periods (t−TL, ..., t−1) and
the interest due on loan contracts over the periods (t−TL, ..., t) that includes the loan obtained
at the start of this period t. Here TL represents the length of a loan period (typically multiple
months, TL = 18). The variable costs consist of the wage bill Wi,t and the fraction of total
investments that are accounted for in the current month. If profits are positive, the firm pays
taxes and dividends according to the rates τ and d, respectively.7
3.7 Dividend payout policy
Define average net earnings (after-tax profits) over the last n months as 〈pii〉n = 1n
∑n−1
s=0 pii,t−s.
The monthly dividend payout is based on the average net earnings over the previous 4 months,
using the dividend rate d (d = 70 percent):
Divi,t = d · 〈pii〉4. (2)
3.8 Firm credit demand
The total liquidity needs to finance the next production cycle consist of the planned production
costs, i.e. the new wage bill and planned investments. Besides expenses related to production,
the firm also needs to finance the financial commitments that are carried over from the previous
production cycle, such as taxes and dividends on profits, debt installments and interest payments.
The total expenditures that need to be financed at the start of the new production period t+ 1
are as follows:
Ei,t+1 = Wi,t+1 + p
inv
i,t+1 · Ii,t+1 + τ max[0, pii,t] +Divi,t (3)
+
TL∑
l=0
Li,t−l
TL
+
TL∑
l=0
rbi,t−l · Li,t−l. (4)
The last two terms represent debt installments and interest payments on old loan contracts
for the previous periods (t − TL, ..., t) that now need to be serviced. Note that by using this
formulation, we allow the firm to obtain a new loan to pay for its taxes and dividends of the
previous period. Note also that dividends are paid out of after-tax firm profits, as is usual in
the tax code. The demand for bank loans is the remaining part of the total liquidity needs that
cannot be financed internally from the payment account (all variables below are determined at
the start of period t+ 1):
Li,t+1 = max[0, Ei,t+1 −Mi,t+1]. (5)
Firms shop around for credit conditions (the interest rates are variable, the debt repayment
period is fixed to 18 months) and request the same amount of credit from a random subset
of banks (by default, we let a firm select 2 out of 20 banks at random). Given the credit
conditions, the firm then selects the bank with the lowest interest rate offer. Thus, this generates
an endogenous network of random credit relationships between banks and firms with some
persistence due to the long debt repayment period.
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3.9 Firm bankruptcy: Entry and Exit
The occurance of firm bankruptcy is driven in the model by either an internal or an external
cause. The internal cause is that a firm fails on its own account and net worth becomes negative.
In this case we speak of firm insolvency. The external cause is due to credit rationing and we
speak of firm illiquidity.
- Insolvency bankruptcy: The firm updates its balance sheet and checks for insolvency at
the end of the production cycle when it has received the revenues from this month’s sales.
If the firm equity becomes negative it is insolvent and goes out of business. It has to
perform a debt restructuring before it can continue operations. We resolve the insolvency
by reducing the firm’s debt, by rescaling it based on the current total assets, i.e. by means
of a debt-equity transformation (see Section 3.10 for details).
- Illiquidity bankruptcy: After visiting the credit market the firm was unsuccessful in raising
all required external funds. It is therefore unable to pay its financial commitments, i.e.,
taxes, debt instalments and interests. Firm equity is positive but it does not have enough
liquidy to continue operations. It should first raise enough funds to become liquid again.
We resolve the illiquidity by reducing the firm’s debt, by rescaling it based on the current
debt (see Section 3.10 for details).
The effects of bankruptcy are that a firm fires all employees who then receive unemployment
benefits from Goverment. The firm suspends all production activities for a year. At the end of
this idle period the firm re-enters and production is restarted. The physical capital stock remains
inside the firm, but is unproductive during the idle period. The local inventory stock is destroyed,
representing the economic loss due to bankruptcy. Finally, there is a debt renegotiation with
the banks. For each loan, the firm defaults on a fraction and the bad debt should be written off
from the bank’s balance sheet at which the loan was obtained.
3.10 Debt deleveraging and restructuring
Debt deleveraging is modelled by re-scaling the total debt. To make it easier for re-entering
firms to obtain new loans we should improve their debt-equity ratio and lower their risk of
default. This makes it more likely for a bank to accept any future loan requests from such a
debt-restructured firm.
In case of an insolvency, the new target debt D∗ is set lower than total assets A. The debt
rescaling parameter ϕ is assumed to be constant across all firms and over time:
D∗ = ϕA with 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 . (6)
After debt restructuring, the equity of the restructured firm is now positive, E∗ = (1−ϕ)A >
0. The debt/equity-ratio after rescaling is given by the constant: D∗/E∗ = ϕ/(1− ϕ).
In case of illiquidity, the firm does not need to renegotiate its debt per se, since D is already
lower then A and equity is still positive. However, since the firm is unable to pay its financial
commitments it should raise new funds. It could do so either on the credit market or in the
stock market by means of issuing new shares, but since we have precluded firms from issuing
new shares (for reasons of simplicity) we also allow illiquid firms to write down part of their
debt. In contrast to insolvent firms, illiquid firms do not rescale their debt as a fraction of assets,
but as a fraction of the original debt:
D∗ = ϕD with 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1 , (7)
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Table 1: Firm balance sheet.
Assets Liabilities
Mi: liquidity deposited at a given bank Di: debts to banks
Invi: value of local inventories at malls Ei: equity
Ki: value of physical capital
with new equity given by E∗ = A−ϕD > E and a new debt/equity-ratioD∗/E∗ = ϕD/(A−ϕD).
Since setting a lower value for the debt/equity-ratio improves the firm’s chances of getting new
loans in the future, the debt rescaling parameter ϕ must be set to low values ϕ ≤ 0.5 to ensure
that D∗/E∗  D/E.
3.11 Banking sector
Commercial banks offer demand deposit accounts (giro payment accounts) and lend to borrowers
at varying interest rates. The firms and households select a random bank to deposit their
savings and this deposit bank remains fixed for each agent throughout the simulation. Only
firms can borrow, and they can initiate a credit relationship with any commercial bank (there is
no relationship banking with a house bank). Firms can have more than one loan at a multitude
of banks, but a new loan request is always served (partially or in full) by just one bank, when
the credit request is successful. It is possible that a new loan request will be partially filled, but
then no spillovers of additional loan requests to other banks occur.
The decision whether or not a credit relationship is established is two-sided: both the firm
and the bank have to agree, and the credit conditions will depend on the balance sheet of both
firm and bank, subject to capital requirement and liquidity constraints. Both the equity of the
bank and the leverage (debt-equity ratio) of the firm enter into the determination of the interest
rate.
Over the course of time, a firm may have a heterogeneous debt portfolio with a multitude of
banks, each charging a different interest rate. Similarly, the bank’s credit relationships evolve
over time and it can charge different interest rates to different firms, depending on the financial
indicators.
There are three reasons why a bank may stop providing new loans: (i) it has violated its
liquidity constraint (the central bank reserve ratio): in this case it needs to borrow reserves from
the Central Bank at an overnight rate. If liquidity is positive again the bank willl automatically
redeem its Central Bank debt. (ii) it violates the capital adequacy ratio, with its equity is still
positive. The bank is not insolvent, but halt its credit supply. (iii) similar to (ii), but now its
equity is negative. This case can occur due to bad debt that is written off. The bank is not
declared bankrupt, but the supply of new liquidity to firms is halted. It continues to service the
demand deposit accounts (withdrawals and interests) and receives interest and debt installment
payments that may lead to a recovery of equity back to positive values.
3.11.1 Bank balance sheet
The balance sheet of the bank is shown in Table 2. Its assets consist of central bank reserves and
outstanding loans to firms. The liabilities are household and firm deposits, and reserve debts to
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Table 2: Bank balance sheet.
Assets Liabilities
M b: liquidity (central bank reserves) M bh: household demand deposits
M bi : firm demand deposits
Lbi : loans to firms D
b: central bank debt
Eb: equity
the Central Bank. Banks receive interest and debt instalment payments on their outstanding
loans to firms, and pay dividends at a constant rate. They do not purchase government bonds,
and they do not purchase shares of other firms or banks. The bank can freely draw advances of
central bank reserves from the discount window at the Central Bank and all banks’ reserves are
deposited at the Central Bank overnight on which the Central Bank pays the base interest. If
the bank has a debt to the Central Bank, it pays the base interest rate to the Central Bank.
The deposit interest rate rb that the bank pays on demand deposit accounts is lower than
the base rate rECB, while the interest rate on loans to firms rbi is higher than the base rate
(rb < rECB < rbi ). This ensures that banks can make a profit. The deposit interest rate r
b
is determined as a mark-down on the base rate, while the interest on loans rbi depends on the
firm-specific balance sheet, in particular on the probability of default. The base rate of the
Central Bank is constant by default. It is made endogenous only in case of monetary policy
experiments.
3.11.2 Bank accounting
Bank reserves fluctuate with deposits and withdrawals, interest payments, and finally also with
taxes and dividends. The net profits (or losses) after taxes and dividends are added to the
reserves and held at the Central Bank. Profits pibt at the end of month t are determined by:
pibt =
∑
i
rbiL
b
it − rb(
∑
h
M bht +
∑
i
M bit) + r
ECB(M bt −Dbt ), (8)
M bt+1 = M
b
t + ∆M
b
ht + ∆M
b
it + (1− τ) max[0, pibt ]− db(1− τ) max[0, pibt ]. (9)
The bank’s profits consist of the margin between interests on loans and interests on deposits, plus
(minus) any interest paid by (to) the Central Bank on overnight reserves (reserve debt). In case
of positive profits, the bank pays taxes and dividends at rates τ and db, resp. The net mutations
of the demand deposit accounts are given by ∆M bh,t = M
b
h,t−M bh,t−1 and ∆M bit = M bi,t−M bi,t−1,
resp.
It is possible that due to deposit mutations the bank’s reserves become negative. We assume
the Central Bank follows a fully accommodating monetary policy by providing liquidity as
needed. The banks thus have a standing facility from which they can draw advances freely. If
bank liquidity is positive, the bank automatically pays off its Central Bank debt and receives
interest on overnight deposits. If liquidity is negative, the bank automatically draws on Central
Bank debt, sets M bt+1 = 0 and D
b
t+1 > 0 and pays daily interest to the Central Bank.
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3.11.3 Bank credit supply and risk-taking behaviour
The bank’s ability to provide credit is restricted by a Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR)
and the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR). The bank’s risk-taking behaviour depends on its
current level of exposure to default risk and the capital requirement.
Firms select banks at random in each production period, so the credit market can be viewed
as a random matching process. The bank records several characteristics of the applying firms:
total debt, size of credit requested, firm equity, and additional risk exposure. These attributes
enter into the risk assessment of the bank and the loan conditions offered to the firm, consisting
of size and interest rate for the loan. The firm then selects the bank with the lowest interest
rate offer.
On a daily basis, the banks rank their stream of credit requests in ascending order of risk
exposure. The least risky credit request of the current day is considered first, but different firms
have different activation days during the month, so each new day sees new firms requesting loans
to the same bank. If a healthy, financially sound firm requests a loan one day after an unhealthy,
financially unsound firm has already obtained a loan with a large risk exposure, the healthy firm
may see itself credit rationed due to limits on the banks’ risk exposure.
3.11.4 Probability of Default
The firm’s probability of default (PD) depends on the creditworthiness of the firm, measured
by the debt-to-equity ratio (including the new debt). Following the internal risk-based (IRB)
approach of the Basel Accords, there is a minimum risk-weight that sets a floor-level for the
probability of default at 3 basis points (0.03 percent). We assume a bank associates the following
PD to a loan of size Lit:
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PDit = max
{
3× 10−4 , 1− e−ν(Dit+Lit)/Eit
}
. (10)
The rule is parametrized by a parameter ν (ν = 0.1) that weights the impact of the debt-to-
equity ratio on the probability of default.
3.11.5 The updating frequency of the Probability of Default
The updating frequency of the risk weights depends either on the bank’s own internal risk-model,
or on the updating frequency of the rating agencies’ credit ratings, if the bank uses such external
ratings. An important question is how often banks should update the risk-weights, or how long
banks should retain the same credit ratings for outstanding loans
In our model, the banks use an updating frequency of one month since the firms have an 18
month debt repayment period, and send monthly debt installments to the bank. Also, the bank
is immediately informed if the firm becomes insolvent. Therefore it seems reasonable, and from
a regulatory perspective also prudent, to let the bank update the PD as frequent as possible,
given the information it has on the creditworthiness of their debtors.
Furthermore, there are no costs to computing the new risk weights, and there are no moni-
toring costs for the banks. Hence, we have assumed perfect information and the highest possible
updating frequency. This means that in the context of our model, banks adjust their risk weights
on a daily basis, whenever a firm makes a loan repayment. Each individual firm makes monthly
payments, but due to the asynchronous nature of the firms’ production plans, each firm has a
different activation day, so that in the end the bank receives daily updates. It takes one month
for the bank to have adjusted all the risk weights on its loan portfolio, but at each moment in
time the banks in the model have perfect information about the value of their RWAs.
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3.11.6 Credit risk
We assume there is no collateral for debt, hence debt is unsecured and the expected loss given
default (or LGD) is one hundred percent of the loan. Due to this assumption, the credit risk or
Exposure at Default (EAD) of the loan is simply the probability of default times the value of
the loan:
EADbit = PDit · Lit. (11)
The total risk exposure of the bank is now simply the sum of risk-weighted assets across the
entire loan portfolio:
RWAbt =
F∑
i=1
K(i)∑
k=0
PDkt · Lkt, (12)
where the index i runs over all firms, and index k = 0, ...,K(i) over loans of firm i with bank b.
3.11.7 Interest rate rule
The interest rate offered to a firm is an increasing function of the credit risk reflecting the risk
premium that the bank charges to more risky, less financially sound firms. The credit risk posed
by firm i enters into the loan conditions as a mark up on the Central Bank base interest rate.
The weight of the credit risk in the interest rate can be calibrated by a behavioural parameter
λB that is the same across all banks (λB = 3). Furthermore, the time-varying operating costs
are captured by a random variable bt , which is uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
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rbit = r
ECB
(
1 + λB · PDit + bt
)
, with bt ∼ U [0, 1]. (13)
3.11.8 Capital Adequacy Requirement
Each bank is required to satisfy a minimal capital adequacy ratio, implying that banks have to
observe a limited exposure to default risk. That is, bank equity (core capital) must be greater or
equal to a fraction κ of the value of its risk-weighted assets. This assumption is based on Basel
II/III capital requirements, where κ is between 4 and 10.5 percent. The bank’s total exposure
to credit risk is restricted by α := κ−1 times the equity of the bank:
Ebt ≥ κ ·RWAbt i.e. RWAbt ≤ α · Ebt (14)
Here Ebt is bank equity (core capital), RWA
b
t is the value of risk-weighted assets, κ is the capital
adequacy ratio, and α := κ−1 is the maximum leverage in terms of equity to risk-weighted
assets. If the constraint is violated the bank stops providing new loans. Pre-existing loans are
still administered, firms continue to pay interest and debt installments, and the demand deposits
of account holders continue to be serviced. From this we derive a credit risk exposure ”budget”
V b that is still available to fund firms:
V bt := α · Ebt −RWAbt . (15)
The supply of credit risk in the current period is restricted to this exposure budget V b. Firm
i receives its full credit whenever the bank’s total credit risk exposure remains below this limit
and is fully rationed when the loan would exceed the risk limit. In terms of the exposure budget
V b the credit offer reads:10
¯`b
it =
{
Lit if PDit · Lit ≤ V bt
0 if PDit · Lit > V bt .
(16)
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Bank risk exposure is positively correlated to the capital adequacy ratio α. Higher α means
more risk is allowed, hence banks have at their disposal a greater budget of excess risk exposure
and will tend to give out more risky loans.
3.11.9 Reserve Requirement
The banks must observe a minimum Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR), that is, reserves must
exceed a fraction 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 of total deposits of households and firms:
M bt ≥ β ·Depbt , where Depbt = M bht +M bit. (17)
From this an excess liquidity ”budget” of the bank is derived as:
W bt := M
b
t − β ·Depbt ≥ 0. (18)
Note that the reserve requirement is modelled here as a behavioral constraint and holds in
addition to the bank’s capital constraint given in (14). That is, we assume the bank anticipates
the requirement, and therefore restricts its lending policy accordingly. The rationale behind this
rule is that banks restrict their supply of credit to the excess liquidity they still have available.
In this way, we capture the behaviour that if a bank approaches the minimum reserve level, it
starts to ration firms with the highest demand for liquidity, and the rationing becomes more
stringent as the excess liquidity declines.
If the excess liquidity budget is sufficient to provide a firm with its requested credit, then it is
serviced in full. Otherwise it is partially credit rationed such that the bank attains its minimum
reserve requirement. In case of partial rationing, the granted loan size is given by:11
`bi,t =

¯`b
i,t if W
b
t ≥ ¯`bi,t
φ · ¯`bi,t if 0 ≤W bt ≤ ¯`bi,t
0 if W bt < 0.
(19)
Here ¯`bi,t is the constrained credit demand resulting from applying the CAR-constraint in
(16). The fraction φ is such that the new reserves (incl. the granted loan) exactly exhausts the
RRR constraint:
{φ : (M bt − φ · ¯`bi,t)− β ·Depbt = 0} ⇔ φ =
M bt − β ·Depbt
¯`b
i,t
=
W bt
¯`b
i,t
.
3.12 Rationing effects
The credit rationing is caused either by banks’ capital requirements becoming binding (an equity
effect) or by its reserve constraint (a liquidity effect). We look at both mechanisms in turn in
Figure 2. Suppose F1 is a financially unsound firm with a high default risk and a high liquidity
demand. B1 is a bank to which F1 requests a loan. The bank(s) B2 are other banks at which F1
has an existing debt. The other firm(s) F2 are financially sound firms with low risk of default
and low liquidity demand.
The figure illustrates how the equity constraint and the liquidity constraint work differently
as transmission channels of financial instabilities. First consider the left panel: Suppose that B1
has a tight liquidity constraint and firm F1 has a high liquidity demand, and is therefore credit
rationed by B1. F1 becomes illiquid, causing it to write off debt with B2. This reduces B2’s
equity, but not its liquidity. Therefore F2 can still receive a loan from B2. The financial contagion
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Table 3: Parameter sensitivity analysis.
α ∈ A 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 16 24 32
β ∈ B 0 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.20 0.50 0.90 0.99 1.00
γ ∈ C 12 14 18 18.5 19 19.5 20 22 24 26
rECB 0 0.001 0.0025 0.005 0.0075 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05
is contained by the stringent liquidity constraint, that rations F1 so that it cannot further
increase its leverage. This liquidity effect can be associated to the bank lending channel. There
is no negative feedback from the liquidity constraint on bank B1 itself, and more importantly
there is no contagion effect on the liquidity constraint of the other banks. The fact that B1
restricts liquidity does not affect the liquidity provision of the other banks B2 to the rest of the
economy.
Now consider the right panel in Fig. 2: Suppose B1 now has a tight equity constraint. Since
F1 has a high default risk it is again credit rationed by B1. Now F1 writes off debt with B2,
this affects the equity of B2, which is under the same strict regulatory regime as B1. Hence, B2
restricts lending to all firms, including F2, even though it has a low default risk. The financial
contagion is not contained, but rather is transmitted and amplified through the balance sheets.
The equity effect is associated to the balance sheet channel, since there is a balance sheet
contagion from bank B1 to bank(s) B2, and this could lead to a balance sheet recession (cf.
Koo, 2009, 2010). The effect is a self-reinforcing mechanism that makes it more restrictive.
Once it becomes binding it causes firm illiquidities, which cause debt write-offs, which reduce
bank equity even further. Such pro-cyclical effects are absent with the liquidity constraint.
Another difference is that for the liquidity constraint the credit demand is partially rationed,
whereas for the equity constraint it is fully rationed (when the loan request exceeds the risk-
exposure budget). The third difference is that the ECB provides additional liquidity as soon as
the liquidity constraint becomes binding, due to its accommodating policy, whereas it does not
provide additional capital when the equity constraint becomes binding.
[ADD FIGURE 2: ”Constraints” ABOUT HERE]
4 Results
4.1 Methodology and Experimental Design
The simulation methodology consists of a Markov Chain Monte Carlo method (MCMC) with
batch runs for each parameter setting. Before running the policy simulations, we generate
a transient under a stable scenario, in order to have a stable starting point. The transient is
ignored in the policy analysis. In the stable benchmark scenario, the parameter γ = 12 indicates
that the competitive pressure on firms in the consumption goods sector is relatively low, i.e. the
consumers’ price sensitivity wrt. price differences between the firms is low, resulting in high
profit margins and low debt. The parameter α = 10 indicates that the CAR constraint is non-
stringent, and will be non-binding most of the time. Finally, the parameter β = 0.10 indicates
that the RRR constraint is non-stringent, and will also be non-binding most of the time.
4.2 Parametrization and empirical calibration
The soundness or robustness of financial and non-financial institutions can be measured by
several financial ratios. A good indicator for the financial robustness is the equity-asset ratio
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which is the opposite of the leverage ratio: Ei/Ai = 1 − Di/Ai. For the financial soundness
of banks, the equity-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio Eb/RWAb indicates the point at which the
capital adequacy requirement becomes binding. When the equity-to-risk ratio falls below the
adequacy ratio κ, the constraint is binding, i.e. when Eb/RWAb ≤ κ.
In order to obtain a rough empirical calibration for the values of the parameter α in the
capital adequacy requirement, we use an empirical study by Hanson et al. (2011, p.39), in which
empirical data on the E/A-ratio of US banks are provided. Historical values for the period
1840-2009 are shown to vary between 4 and 55 percent, and for the period 1976-2009 values
varied between 4 an 14 percent. For the period 1996-2009, the equity-to-risk-weighted-assets
ratio of US banks varied between 8 and 20 percent, which corresponds in our model to α = 12.5
and α = 5, resp.
To convert the equity-to-total-assets ratio into the equity-to-risk-weighted-assets ratio, a rule
of thumb is to multiply by two, assuming the average risk weight is 0.5 (Ratnovski, 2013, p.66).
Hence, a 4 percent equity-to-total-assets ratio corresponds to 8 percent equity-to-risk-weighted-
assets, and α = 12.5 in our model. And a 55 percent equity-to-total-assets ratio corresponds
to a 110 percent equity-to-risk-weighted-assets, or α = 0.9 (i.e., risk-weighted assets covered by
more than 100 percent of equity). Therefore the empirical range for the α-values lies between 1
and 12.5.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has proposed the following Basel III
phase-in arrangements from 2013 to 2019 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013).
The Minimum Common Equity Capital Ratio is 4.5 percent, i.e. the Common Equity Tier-1
capital (CET1) should be 4.5 percent of the value of risk-weighted assets. In addition, there is
the mandatory Capital Conservation Buffer of 2.5 percent, totaling 7 percent of common equity
capital. The minimum total capital ratio is 8 percent, consisting of Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital. On
top of that, the national regulatory authorities are allowed to levy a discretionary Countercyclical
Buffer on Globally Systemically Important Banks, the so called G-SIBs, of between 1 and 2.5
percent (totaling 10.5 percent of Common Equity Tier-1 capital).
For the parameter values of α, these percentages 4.5, 7, 8, and 10.5 correspond to α = 22,
14.4, 12.5 and 9.5, respectively. The theoretically proposed range of α therefore lies between 9.5
and 22. To take into account both the empirical data and the Basel III regulatory scheme as
proposed by the BCBS for 2019, we calibrated our simulations to α-values that lie between 2
and 32.
To obtain an empirical calibration for the values of the parameter β in the reserve require-
ment, we use the current values as set by the Central Banks around the world. In Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, the U.K. and Sweden there is no reserve requirement, while in China it
is 19.5 percent (as of Feb. 2015). In the U.S. it can be 0, 3 or 10 percent, depending on the net
transaction accounts at the depository institution. For the Eurozone the reserve requirement is
1 percent. Finally, there is the Chicago Plan for Monetary Reform (Douglas et al., 1939), in
which the authors call for a 100 percent reserve requirement.
In order to do justice to this wide range of variability, we did not calibrate the value of β, but
instead used the full range of values between 0 and 100 percent. The parameter settings in Table
3 are the combinations used for the policy analysis, varying from non-binding to strongly-binding
capital and liquidity constraints, respectively. With α ∈ A, β ∈ B we explore a 10 × 10-grid.
The parameters γ = 18.5 and rECB = 0.01, which are our default values under the unstable
scenario (see below), are fixed throughout, but we have performed robustness tests with respect
to the values mentioned in the table.
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4.3 Baseline Scenario
After running the stable benchmark scenario for generating the initial state of the economy,
we now vary the policy parameters to generate various unstable economies. This is achieved
by increasing the consumers’ price sensitivity parameter from γ = 12 to γ = 18.5, that is, by
increasing the competitive pressure on the firms which will reduce their profit margins.
In the baseline scenario both CAR and RRR constraints are weak, using the following
parameter settings: α = 8, that is, the banks’ core capital should be at least 12.5 percent of
total risk-weighted assets, and β = 0.10, that is, there is a 10 percent central bank reserve
requirement.
Scenario description Figure 3 shows the correlation between the business cycle and the
financial cycle in the model. The figure illustrates the classic Minskian mechanism of a risky
boom, i.e. during the upswing of the business cycle leverage and financial fragility increases,
while during a downturn the opposite occurs (Minsky, 1978, 1986). This also corresponds to the
mechanism identified by Geanakoplos (2009) as the Leverage Cycle, which explains the increase
in financial fragility in terms of collateral constraints.
The figure also shows that financial fragility is synchronized with the business cycle. During
booms (phase I, II and III) the firm’s leverage rate increases, indicated by a decrease in the
average equity/asset ratio, showing signs of increased fragility. Recessions (between phases I-II
and II-III) are deleveraging, with an increase in the average equity/asset ratio, which indicates an
improvement in financial robustness. During the recovery stage (phase II) the financial fragility
increases again, only to be followed by another fragile boom phase. In general, not all boom
phases need to be fragile and associated with increased leverage. Similarly, not all recessions
need to be deleveraging. Note that at the end of the boom phase I, at the turning point, the
average equity/asset-ratio continues to decrease for a while. This is also the case after the second
boom phase II, and is most likely due to a debt overhang which causes the financial fragility to
have some inertia.
[ADD FIGURE 3: ”Mechanism of Financial Instability Hypothesis” ABOUT HERE]
To uncover the main mechanisms that are underlying this macroscopic result, we illustrate
in Figures 4 and 5 the microeconomic situation (or meso-economic, since the plots show sector
averaged variables). We show plots for selected variables of the real sector and the banking
sector: output, bank activity (number of active units), firm activity (number of insolvencies
and illiquidity bankruptcies, for small and large firms), firm sector total debt (again for small
and large firms), bank sector average risk exposure, bank sector average equity, firm fragility
(average equity-to-asset ratio), and the mean interest rate charged on all new loans per month.
[ADD FIGURE 4: ”Baseline Scenario – Financial variables” ABOUT HERE]
[ADD FIGURE 5: ”Baseline Scenario – Real variables” ABOUT HERE]
1. Expansion. We start with equal amounts of large and small firms, defined with respect to
the mean capital stock: small (large) firms have a capital stock below (above) the mean
capital stock, resp. However, this quickly bifurcates into many small firms and a few large
firms (Panel 5e).
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From the start, the large firms have a slightly higher capital stock and a higher utilization
rate. Hence, the large firms have higher output per firm (Panel 5a) and invest more
to expand their production capacities (Panel 5c). At the same time, due to the high
competitive pressure, their profit margins are low and some large firms are also generating
negative profits (Panel 5b), so they need debt to finance their investments. The investments
per firm are substantially higher than those of small firms, who do not invest that much
(Panel 5c).
2. Financial side. How are firms able to finance their investments? Since profits are negative
and declining, they need new credit to roll-over the old debt. The financial robustness
(measured by the equity-asset ratio) of large firms is always below that of small firms,
indicating that they are more fragile (Panel 4g, black curve). The booms typically display
an increased leveraging of the large firms (Panel 4g, black curve), as they must invest to
expand (Panel 4d, period 80-150, and period 200-300).
3. Credit bubble. Along the credit bubble the average rate of debt of large firms is building up
much quicker than debt of the small firms (Panel 4c). The financial robustness of firms is
pro-cyclical; it decreases during recessions and increases during boom phases (as in Figure
3, phase I).
4. Capacity utilization in relation to investments. The capacity utilization rate is also pro-
cyclical and is leading the business cycle by several months, which corresponds to empirical
findings in Stock and Watson (1999). During a recession firms make more use of their ex-
isting capital stock rather than investing in new capital goods. The utilization rate reaches
its maximum during the boom and already starts to decline well before the downturn oc-
curs (see Panel 5d), making it a good indicator for business cycle turning points. During
the boom phase investments are high, but the utilization rate already starts to decline due
to a slowdown in output, followed by a decline in investments. This is an indication of
over-capacities building up during the boom stage of the cycle. When the boom stage is
finally over and the cycle has reached its top, the utilization rate is already at a minimum
(around 50 percent), investment declines, and financial robustness is at a minimum, i.e.
financial fragility is at maximum (Panel 4g, and Figure 3, between phase I-II).
5. Banks. Due to the non-restrictive capital constraint the banks support sound firms as
well as unhealthy firms for a long period of time. This yields a higher level of exposure to
default risk during booms since the supply of credit is linked to bank equity and therefore
pro-cyclical (Panel 4e). Banks become inactive only gradually (Panel 4b), because the
capital requirement is slack (Panel 4b, the red line indicates the number of banks that
become inactive due to the capital constraint). Eventually, the liquidity constraint is
binding for some banks because large firms’ credit demand increases over time (Panel 4b,
the green line indicates the number of banks that become inactive due to the liquidity
constraint).
6. As a result of this broad supply of liquidity, a considerable number of large and unsound
firms continue to produce and receive roll-over credit to finance their debt, exhibited by an
unstable debt bubble (Panel 4d, black line). The number of active firms however remains
at an artificially high level, since large firms that are actually insolvent and that should
have been credit rationed much sooner (had the constraint been more restrictive) are kept
alive almost artificially by the banks (below we identify such unsound firms as Zombie-
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firms a` la Caballero et al., 2008). In this case the illiquidities are being caused by a binding
liquidity constraint of the bank (Panel 4b, green curve and Panel 4c, period 275).
7. Credit Crunch and Re-bound. At the moment the liquidity constraint becomes active,
the new credit to large firms declines (Panel 4d, black line, t = 200). There is a sudden
deleveraging of the large firms, shown by the sudden increase in the average E/A-ratio
(Panel 4g, period 200). At the same time, their profits improve (Panel 5b), since invest-
ments and hence debts decline (Panel 5c). The large firms can increase their output by
increasing their capacity utilization rate instead (Panel 5d).
The debt restructuring does not affect the capital stock, so after the unhealthy firms have
successfully written off some of their debt, they come back with the same production
capacity and start again to expand. This results in another round of leveraging, a new
credit bubble is building up (Panel 4d, black line, t = 250 − 300), and this is associated
to a decreasing E/A-ratio (Panel 4g). Also profits are steeply declining (Fig. 5 Panel 4b)
while investments increase (Panel 5c). As a result, there remain many illiquidities of both
large and small firms even long after the credit crunch (Panel 4c).
8. Comparison of small and large firms. Throughout the entire episode, the small firms do
not expand their production capacity and have constant output. Because of their low rate
of investments their capital stock even declines (Panel 5g). On the financial side the small
firms have positive or slightly negative profits and their financial robustness is better than
that of the large firms.
4.3.1 Prevention and mitigation policies
Is the credit crunch scenario illustrated above avoidable by restricting the supply of credit?
We study this question using the policy parameter β that sets the reserve requirement. For
higher values of β, the banks’ excess liquidity decreases, leading to a lower supply of credit and
the firms’ debt levels should be more moderate. The financial instability due to the Minskian
dynamics of increasing leverage should be less pronounced.
A relevant policy question is: Can we prevent the economic collapse by implementing a
restrictive liquidity supply policy, such that large and financially unsound firms are allowed to
fail, due to an induced credit rationing, before they become too big to fail? Is it prudent to
restrict liquidity before a credit crunch occurs?
A second question is whether after a credit crunch has already occurred, does it help to
restrict the risk exposure of banks to mitigate any damaging effects? One of the origins of the
credit crunch is the unwillingness of banks to lend due to their own deteriorated equity levels.
A solution of monetary policy is then to reduce the base interest rate of the Central Bank and
allow banks to obtain reserves more cheaply from the Central Bank, which they can then use to
lend on to firms.
However, since banks in this scenario do not have a liquidity problem but rather an equity
problem, pumping more liquidity into the system will not work, since banks are inclined to use
that extra liquidity to improve their own balance sheets. This can be related to the notion of
balance sheet recessions, that is, recessions driven by debt deleveraging leading to a prolonged
slump (Koo, 2009, 2010). Instead of passing it on to firms in the form of loans, banks can use
the additional reserves to purchase government bonds, or invest in firm equity, or other financial
assets, in order to receive the capital gains and dividends from such investments. It is to be
expected that the additional liquidity provided to the banking sector in a quantitative easing
policy will not lead to inflation of the consumer prices, but will in all likelihood lead to asset
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price inflation, i.e. an asset bubble. There is ample empirical evidence in support of this claim,
for example the Japanese stock market bubble in 1987-1990, and the more recent experiences
with the U.S. stock market bubble in 2010, and the EU stock market bubble in January 2015.
Each of these episodes was preceded by very low discount rates, and banks using the excess
reserves to invest in high-yield assets, what we earlier referred to as a ’flight to quantity’.
In other words, a monetary policy aimed at fixing the credit crunch after it has occurred by
flooding the market with liquidity is not likely to work since it goes against the incentives of the
bank. Instead, what could be done to prevent a credit crunch is to restrict the level of default
risk and thereby to prevent banks from entering into the situation of having low equity levels in
the first place.
Such a monetary policy could be steered by the capital adequacy ratio. Therefore we proceed
by demonstrating the effect of a more restrictive capital constraint, and investigate whether this
helps in restraining the banks sufficiently in order to prevent unhealthy firms from growing too
large that they pose a systemic risk to the entire banking system.
4.4 Policy analysis
In this subsection we examine how a tightening of the Capital Adequacy Requirement (CAR)
respectively the Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) affects the economic dynamics. We follow
the empirical literature on the relationship between financial cycles and business cycles (c.f.
Claessens et al., 2011; Jorda` et al., 2011; Schularick and Taylor, 2012) to select the relevant
indicators for measuring a positive policy effect (see Appendix B for details). In particular, we
consider the amplitude and cumulative loss of output during recessions as an indicator of the
economic loss associated to severe downturns. The amplitude of a recession is measured in units
of output, from the top of the boom phase to the through of the downturn. The cumulative loss
is measured as the output that is not being produced during the entire duration of the recession,
by combining the amplitude and the duration measure. In line with our main motivation for
this study we are especially interested in the effects of the different policies on the lower part
of the distribution of these measures, i.e. on the severity and probability of the most extreme
downturns.
4.4.1 Tightening the capital adequacy requirement
In Figure 6 we report results for the amplitude of recessions, under different scenarios with
respect to the CAR. The box plots show the distribution of all amplitude values for all recessions
that occur, pooled across 20 simulation runs (one run contains on average 5− 10 recessions, so
the number of observations lies between 100− 200 recessions per box plot).
The considered range for α-values is from 1 to 32. The current capital adequacy ratio in Basel
II is κ = 4 percent, corresponding to α = 25. The minimal core capital requirement proposed
in Basel III is set at κ = 7 percent, which corresponds to α ≈ 14, whereas the value κ = 10.5
percent (α ≈ 9) holds if all regulatory requirements including the discretionary counter-cyclical
capital buffers for SIFIs are taken into account.
The box plots in Figure 6 show that for the maximal value of α = 32 (3 percent regulatory
capital) the bottom whisker indicates that 95 percent of recessions have amplitudes between
0 and −1900 units of output lost. A more restrictive CAR implies lower values of α and this
corresponds to an increase in the amplitude of recessions, at least until one reaches α = 4, which
corresponds to a capital adequacy ratio of κ = 25 percent and is still within the range proposed
by Admati and Hellwig (2013). The extremely low values of α = 1 and α = 2 correspond to
κ = 100 percent and κ = 50 percent resp., which are theoretically feasible, but implausible
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values in practice. A capital adequacy ratio of 100 percent would surely make the economy very
stable and reduce the amplitude of severe downturns, which is also seen in the box plots, but
this level is politically unattainable.
[ADD FIGURE 6: ”Boxplots Capital Adequacy Requirement” ABOUT HERE]
To understand in more detail the mechanisms underlying this observation we consider the
dynamics in a scenario with a very restrictive CAR, namely α = 2.0 (κ = 50 percent) and
β = 0.10. We emphasize that is not meant to be a realistic value, but is used to clearly illustrate
the dynamics at work. This scenario shows exactly what happens during a credit crunch when
all banks stop lending. The main driving mechanism behind the economic collapse is the slow
build-up of debt in unhealthy firms that increases the risk exposure of banks. A strict capital
constraint causes a sudden collapse, instead of a more gradual deleveraging of debt. This sudden
collapse then gets transmitted to the real sector. In Figure 7 we illustrate the main mechanisms
underlying such effects of a tight CAR constraint.
[ADD FIGURE 7: ” Scenario Capital Adequacy Requirement” ABOUT HERE]
1. Build-up. The non-binding, weak liquidity constraint has flushed the credit market with
liquidity, so that total credit develops into a bubble (Panel d). At the start many firms are
increasing their debt to finance production and financial commitments. As in the baseline
scenario, the large firms have large liquidity needs, so they cause the banks to build up
large risk exposures (Panel e). But since in this scenario the CAR constraint is more
strict, they hit it more often. This tougher constraint shields a small number of banks
from becoming insolvent, although they do become inactive due to a binding CAR (Panel
b). They can become active again later on.
2. Credit Crunch. Once banks have stopped lending, the deposits in these banks are no longer
available on the RHS of the RRR constraint, which makes them ”unproductive”. If other
banks would hold these deposits they could expand the liquidity supply by leveraging up
their reserves. So in this respect, the reserves in the inactive banks are unproductive.
This affects the unhealthy firms the most since they have lower E/A-ratios (higher D/E
ratios) which puts them at the bottom of the risk-ranking in the banks. Hence, the large
firms are more likely to be credit rationed and the number of illiquid large firms increases
in comparison to the baseline scenario. However, also the small firms are harmed due to
the consequent credit crunch (Panel c).
3. Insolvency of bad firms. The economic breakdown occurs in two stages. The first stage is
characterized by unhealthy (Ponzi) firms becoming insolvent (Panel c, black and red curves
indicate insolvent firms). The insolvencies of bad firms are not harmful in the beginning,
but as bad firms have higher debt, they will default on larger loans as well, affecting the
banks’ balance sheets through the equity channel (the narrow bank lending channel).
4. Bank equity. The continued insolvencies of these firms causes a slow deterioration of bank
equity (Panel f). This affects the banks’ ability to provide new loans, as the budget for
risk exposure is diminished. The more restrictive CAR implies that the turning point in
the bank equity bubble comes earlier, hence the credit crunch starts earlier.
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5. Active capital constraint. When the equity of a majority of banks has eroded sufficiently,
the capital constraint becomes active. The plot of bank activity (Panel b) illustrates well
that the first constraint to become binding is the capital constraint (the red line indicates
the number of banks that have become inactive due to a binding CAR constraint). Note
that the total number of inactive banks includes banks that are insolvent, as well as banks
that have either the CAR or RRR constraint binding. At the same time, a small number
of banks stop lending due to negative equity and the first wave of illiquid firms ensues
around period 180 (Panel c).
6. Credit crunch. In the second stage it is the re-financing of debt by the Ponzi firms that
are not yet insolvent but that require liquidity to keep them afloat which is going to bring
about a collapse in output (Panel a, period 325). First, the disappearance of bad firms
reduces total output since they go out of business.
7. Large firms rescale production. Second, the bad firms that do remain in business cannot get
any credit for production or to service debt. Since priority is given to debt servicing, they
must rescale production. Thus, the collapse in output is the combination of a production
stop by the inactive firms and the reduction in output by the active firms (Panel a, period
325).
8. Bad firm illiquidity. There is a large number of synchronous illiquidities of bad firms, since
the bank gives priority to healthy firms and rations the credit to unhealthy firms (Panel
c). This could be either small (S) or large (L) firms. What happens to these illiquid firms?
During the bankruptcy procedure these firms are restructuring their debt, so they return
(after 12 months) as healthy firms in the population. However, as soon as the capital
constraint of the bank ceases to be restrictive (i.e, the bank’s risk exposure is reduced due
to the debt restructuring of the illiquid firms) the number of Ponzi financed firms starts
to increase again and another debt bubble is formed (Panel a, around period 250-300).
9. Banks inactive. This causes further damage to the bank balance sheets and as soon as
equity is negative or the maximum exposure limit is reached the bank stops providing loans
to firms all together. This reduces many banks to the inactive status (Panel b, period 325)
due to negative net worth (Panel f, period 325) and results in an overall credit crunch
(Panel c, period 325). The banks’ excess liquidity is still positive, so the banks could lend
from a liquidity point of view, but their regulatory core capital does not allow it.
10. Restarting the credit bubble. Because there is no restriction on liquidity, the debt bubble
will restart after the capital constraint has relaxed again (Panel d, after period 400).
It is important to note that the liquidity constraint (RRR) in this case hardly ever becomes
binding, as the value of β is too low. This can be verified in (Panel b, green curve) which
indicates the number of banks that become inactive due to a binding liquidity constraint. Note
that at the moment of the credit crunch, around period 250, the number of illiquid large firms
is higher than the number of illiquid small firms, which is an indication of an indirect contagion
effect through the banking system which we could call the Zombie-effect (see Caballero et al.,
2008). The Zombie-effect is the notion that a small number of unhealthy firms with a high risk
profile hamper the ability of banks to provide liquidity to other, more healthy firms. After the
unhealthy firms have been allowed to grow and subsequently become insolvent and write off
their debt, the banks’ equity is depressed to such a degree that they cannot supply any credit to
any other firms. It is therefore in the interest of these banks to keep the bad firms alive as long
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as possible, hence the name Zombie-firms. In addition, there continue to be firm illiquidities
(Panel c) for a long period of time after the sudden wave of illiquidities. Another important
effect is the large concentration in the banking sector (Panel b, after period 325 only 2 or 3
banks remain active).
Network analysis
Figure ?? shows this effect in terms of the time-evolution of the network of credit relationships
between banks and firms. Shown are snapshots of the network, at t = −300, 500, 900 and 1, 000
months. The initial state at t = −300 (before the burn-in state) is such that each firm (n = 80)
has a single loan with a randomly assigned bank (b = 20). After some time a core-periphery
network appears endogenously, with some banks in the centre of the network having many credit
links, while other banks that are on the periphery have far fewer links. The endogenous link
formation process can be described as follows:
1. At t = 500: the network is fully developed, with 10 banks in the core, with each bank
having more than 10 links (the largest connected component), 5 banks in the periphery
with 1-9 links, and 5 banks are completely disconnected.
2. At t = 900: the network starts to break down as the financial contagion effect produces a
concentration in the banking sector.
3. At t = 1, 000: the breakdown is more clearly visible with only 4 banks remaining in the core,
6 banks in the periphery, and the remaining 10 banks that are completely disconnected
without any credit relationships.
[ADD FIGURE ??: ”Networks” ABOUT HERE]
The (dis)advantage of strict capital policies
After having seen these results, we might ask: Is there any advantage to having a strict capital
adequacy requirement? Risky firms are restricted from obtaining large debts, so that as the
debt bubble breaks banks are less affected. The sudden effectiveness of the capital constraint
causes more banks to survive, but it does not prevent the surge of firm illiquidities that follow
the credit crunch.
The disadvantage of a strict capital policy is that after the CAR constraint is no longer
binding, the surviving banks have high liquid resources that are now used to start another
credit bubble. Since there has been a wash-out of the competition and a concentration in
the banking system the remaining banks now gain more profits and can maintain the credit
bubble for longer. The bad firms can again obtain financing, output recovers quickly, but in
the meantime the average debt of bad firms is building up to greater heights than during the
original bubble.
In conclusion, a more stringent CAR constraint does not solve the underlying problem that
banks are running up their risk exposure and that financially unsound firms are receiving too
much credit. To solve this, a combination of the capital adequacy ratio and the liquidity con-
straint seems needed.
In the next scenario the restrictive capital constraint is replaced by a restrictive liquidity
constraint. Instead of breaking the credit bubble the intent is now to prevent the bubble from
growing in the first place.
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4.4.2 Tightening the reserve requirement
In Figure 8 we report results for the amplitude of recessions, under different scenarios with
respect to the RRR constraint (varying the parameter β). As above, the box plots show the
distribution of all amplitude values for all recessions that occur, pooled across 20 simulation runs.
The considered values of β span the entire range from 0 to 100 percent reserve requirement, and
a more restrictive RRR corresponds to higher β-values. For the α-value we have considered here
the most restrictive case of Basel III, namely α = 9.5 (κ = 10.5 percent). From the box plots
it becomes clear that a more restrictive RRR is associated to a decrease in the amplitude of
recessions.
The generic robustness of this result is illustrated by Figure 9, which shows a two-dimensional
parameter sensitivity analysis for a 10-by-10 grid of parameter values α = 4, ..., 32 and β =
0, ..., 1.0. Each grid cell contains the value of the lower whisker of the box plot of the amplitude
of recessions (across 20 runs). The generic result is that a tighter Reserve Requirement Ratio of
50 percent works much better to contain the severe downturns than a tighter CAR constraint.
[ADD FIGURE 8: ”Boxplots Reserve Requirement Ratio” ABOUT HERE]
[ADD FIGURE 9: ”Two-dimensional parameter sensitivity plot” ABOUT HERE]
To explore this scenario in more detail we consider the dynamics under the parameter setting
α = 8 and β = 0.5, corresponding to a restrictive 50 percent reserve requirement but a non-
restrictive capital adequacy ratio of 12.5 percent. Figure 10 illustrates the main mechanisms for
this scenario.
[ADD FIGURE 10: ” Scenario Reserve Requirement” ABOUT HERE]
1. Liquidity constraint binding. The bank gives credit up to its constraint which then becomes
binding (Panel b, green curve). As the liquidity constraint is binding, the capital constraint
is not binding (Panel b, red curve). In case a bank is illiquid it draws advances from the
Central Bank and remains active. This means banks with a binding liquidity constraint all
remain active and equity remains positive. Since the credit demand of large unsound firms
is typically larger than that of small firms – the replacement investments are typically
larger when the firm has a larger capital stock, and total debt is larger in order to finance
the investments – the former are more often credit rationed than the latter. This causes
large firms to enter into illiquidity bankruptcy at an earlier stage and not all simultaneously
(Panel c, blue curve).
2. Waves of illiquidity instead of one big surge of illiquid firms. Because the liquidity con-
straint remains binding, large firms are becoming insolvent and illiquid during the entire
second half of the simulation (Panel c, black and blue curves). The bad debt is spread out
over time and does not harm the banking sector that much, allowing it to be absorbed by
the banking system and banks become inactive more gradually. (Panel b, black curve).
3. A Schumpeterian Cleansing Effect. The banks continue to provide loans, hence after the
wash-out of the financially unsound large firms that became illiquid (Panel c, periods 200
and 300), a new credit bubble is formed and total credit to firms is increasing again (Panel
d, red line,periods 225, 325). This could be attributed to a so called cleansing effect of
Schumpeterian firm evolution, in which the bad firms are bankrupted in favour of the more
healthy surviving firms.
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4. Total bank exposure (Panel e) is lower in the case of the restrictive liquidity constraint
exactly due to the absence of a credit crunch. Moreover, this total exposure is distributed
among many more banks hence the banking system as a whole is more robust against the
failure of a single, large firm.
Advantage of the non-restrictive reserve requirement
If there is no restraint on lending this encourages over-leveraging by the banks, the supply of
new loans is high, and the bank takes on more risk. The possibility to refinance old debt causes
firm indebtedness to rise, even if profits are decreasing, so this encourages over-leveraging by
firms. Financial fragility is expected to increase.
The weak liquidity constraint allows the credit bubble to form until it breaks due to the
capital constraint. In this case there is no bail-out of banks, no recapitalization, so the banks
suffer and a credit crunch follows in which banks suddenly refuse to lend. This could lead to
many simultaneous firm illiquidities.
The restrictive liquidity constraint does not allow a credit bubble to form in the first place.
It is pre-emptively cutting the bubble off and forces a deleveraging of debt. There is a higher
likelihood of banks staying alive since the lower exposure to fragile firms causes smaller bad
debt when they go bankrupt, hence less harm is done to the banking system. Also, the risk of
synchronous firm failures is smaller.
A fully accommodating monetary policy by the central bank implies it will step in to provide
liquidity to failing banks automatically through the standing facility or discount window. This
saves the banks, preventing a bank collapse and they continue to lend to all firms, financially
sound or unsound. They also continue new credit to large firms to roll-over larger debts. The
number of supported unsound firms remains high, and bad debt remains high as well. But the
collapse in output seen in the baseline scenario is prevented.
In general, the illiquidities of healthy firms have been replaced by their insolvencies. This is
a good feature, in the sense that the illiquidities signalled an inefficient allocation of credit that
resulted in a ”congestion”-effect in the credit market. In the scenario with restrictive reserve
requirement, the insolvencies indicate that banks are letting unhealthy firms exit the market
instead of supporting them and crowding out the smaller, healthier firms.
Another advantage is that the higher reserve requirement bolsters banks’ equity. The rela-
tively high number of bad firms that can be sustained in such a case due to the banks’ robustness
leads to a lower exposure to credit risk. Moreover, this risk exposure is distributed among many
banks, reducing the risk that a single bank failure causes a sudden wave of simultaneous firm
illiquidities, which would again affect the banking system. The banks are robust enough to cope
with the negative effects of supporting the financially unsound firms, while at the same time
allowing a moderate number of unsound firms to fail. This allows them to support more of the
financially healthy firms, and to prevent the ”congestion”-effect on the credit market.
5 Discussion
In this paper we have considered the leverage cycle as the main transmission channel of risk
between firms and banks. The traditional transmission channel of monetary policy is through
the credit channel, i.e. the broad and narrow channels, that refer to changes in the value of
assets on the balance sheets of borrowers and lenders, respectively. This dichotomy however
overlooks the important role of collateral constraints, which bind the two channels together.
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Our analysis shows that a liquidity constraint that prevents banks from fueling a debt bubble,
that is mainly caused by the financially unsound firms requiring new debt to roll-over old debt,
is of crucial importance for the banks’ survival. Hence, such a constraint is highly effective in
avoiding deep downturns of the economy.
A capital adequacy requirement is insufficient to ensure the viability of the banks, since
without the liquidity constraint the banks might continue to finance certain bad firms and a
debt bubble will (re-)appear. Sooner or later these bad firms will become insolvent. When this
occurs the bad debt will affect the banks’ equity, and so reduces the supply of liquidity.
If there is a liquidity constraint in place, the unsound firms are credit constrained first, before
they become insolvent, and this causes them to enter into early illiquidity bankruptcy, without
the banks’ equity being affected too much to cause serious damage to the banking sector. By
cutting-off the provision of credit to the unsound firms they are also prevented from building
up large debts, hence the total bad debt is lower. A debt bubble and subsequent credit crunch
does not appear, allowing banks to absorb the moderate write-off’s on their balance sheets.
Concerning the effect of different types of credit market regulations on macroeconomic per-
formance, we have four main results wrt. to the amplitude of severe downturns: (i) a more
restrictive capital adequacy ratio corresponds to an increase in the amplitude of recessions; (ii)
a more restrictive reserve requirement ratio corresponds to an decrease in the amplitude of reces-
sions; (iii) a very tight reserve requirement ratio of 50 percent or more generically works better
to dampen severe downturns than any level of restrictive capital adequacy ratios; and (iv) due
to the restrictive liquidity constraint, the illiquidities of healthy firms have been replaced by
their insolvency, preventing a ”congestion”-effect from occurring on the credit market.
Many avenues for further research on the relationship between firms’ financial fragility and
banks’ systemic risk remain. Next on our research agenda is the analysis of the endogenous
network dynamics. For example, one could study the network of banks just before a crisis
occurs, and compare that network structure to the empirical bank network data. We have
hinted at this in the main text, where we show that the number of banks that remain active
is gradually declining in the system, hence the financial contagion causes a concentration effect
in the banking sector. One could also consider the time-evolution of an empirical bank-firm
network, with or without considering crisis periods, and then compare the empirical network
dynamics to the network dynamics in the model.
Currently, our model contains only one dynamic network structure that is formed endoge-
nously: the firm-bank network of credit relationships. This could easily be extended to include:
(a) an interbank market with bank-to-bank credit relationships; (b) a model with trade-credit
with firm-to-firm credit linkages; (c) an extension for explicitly addressing macro-prudential pol-
icy issues; (d) stress-testing of individual banks, or of the network as a whole, by tracking the
domino-effects of financial contagion, see, e.g., Battiston et al. (2012) for work in this direction.
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Table 4: List of parameters.
Symbol Name Value
Agents
Households 1600
Consumption goods producers 80
Investment goods producers 1
Banks 20
Central Bank 1
Government 1
Consumption goods
γ Price sensitivity 18.5
τ Income tax rate 0.05 (5%)
Credit market
TLoan Debt repayment period 18 months
rECB ECB base interest rate 0.01 (1%)
rd Deposit interest rate 0.009 (0.9%)
λB Bank’s interest rate multiplier 3
ϕ Debt rescaling 0.30 (30%)
Financial market
α Capital Adequacy Requirement 8 (12.5%)
β Reserve Requirement 0.10 (10%)
d Dividend ratio 0.70 (70%)
nR Months of revenues in dividend rule 6
nE Months of net earnings in dividend rule 4
µ Threshold in dividend rule 0.5
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         Activity          Role       Agent          Agent    Role          Activity 
E u r a c e @ U n i b i
Bank
   InvGoodFirm
Household
asset demand
savings decision
Financial
Market
(index bond)
ECB
Monetary
policy
Gov
Policy
maker
Investor
ConsGoodFirm
Consumer
Cons.
Goods 
Market
(local malls)
cgood demand
consumption 
choice
Producercgood supply
posted prices
labor supply
reservation wage
Employee labor demand
wage schedule
Labor
Market
(search & 
matching)
Creditor Debtor
credit supply
rank credit risk
credit demand
rank interest
Credit
Market
(credit 
rationing)
Employer
InvestorProducer
Capital
Goods
Market
igood supply
vintage menu
posted prices
igood demand
vintage choices
Figure 1: Overview of the Eurace@Unibi model.
Figure 2: Liquidity and equity channels of financial contagion.
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Figure 3: Mechanism of the Financial Instability Hypothesis. Parameters: α = 8, β = 0.50,
γ = 20.
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Figure 6: Boxplots of the amplitude of recessions for different values of α and β = 0.10. Pa-
rameter sensitivity analysis wrt. the α-parameter related to the Capital Adequacy Requirement
(CAR). A more restrictive CAR (lower α-values) corresponds to the an increase in the amplitude
of recessions. Amplitude is measured as the total loss in output, from the peak of a boom to
the through of the recession. For each parameter value the boxplot shows the distribution of all
recessions across 20 batch runs, for simulations of 500 months.
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Figure 8: Boxplots of the amplitude of recessions for different values of β and α = 9.5
(κ = 10.5%). A parameter sensitivity analysis wrt. the β-parameter for the Reserve Re-
quirement Ratio (RRR). A more restrictive RRR (higher β-values) corresponds to a decrease in
the amplitude of recessions. Amplitude is measured as the total loss in output, from the peak
of a boom to the through of the recession. For each parameter value the boxplot shows the
distribution of all recessions across 20 batch runs, for simulations of 500 months.
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A Note on behavioral assumptions and model consistency
As in any economic situation, we should distinguish between ex ante and ex post, and take into
account the expectations that agents form about the constraints they are facing. Before tak-
ing any decision, agents are guided in their behavior by their perceived (anticipated, expected)
constraints they belief they are facing. These perceived constraints we may call ex ante con-
straints. However, the actual constraints that agents in fact face ex post may be less restrictive
or more restictive than the agent had anticipated. This distinction between ex ante and ex post
constraints will be important in what follows.
We have the following definition on the model consistency of behavioral assumptions:
Definition 1 A behavioral assumption is called model consistent if the ex ante, perceived con-
straint coincides with the ex post, actual constraint.
In our modelling of the risk-taking behavior of the banks (Sect. 3.11.3), the ex ante con-
straints are the perceived RRR constraint (Eqn.19) and the perceived CAR constraint (Eqn.16),
which strongly influence the lending behavior of the bank. These behavioral constraints are
more restrictive than the actual, ex post constraints, as will be shown below. We interpret this
as if our banks are behaving cautiously.
For the RRR constraint this is so, because the excess reserves of the bank are not decreased
by the full amount of the granted loan (as specified in the ex ante behavioral constraint in
Eqn.19).
When a bank grants a loan, it does not pay out of its cash fault, nor does it pay the loan
out of its reserves. Hence, the mere creation of a loan does not affect the bank’s actual reserves
immediately, at least not initially. What the bank does is it creates the loan on the assets side of
its balance sheet, and simultaneously creates a temporary account on its liabilities side, thereby
increasing the size of its balance sheet. Whether or not this will affect the reserves depends on
whether the firm has a payment account with the loan issuing bank, or whether it transfers the
money to some other account with a counter-party bank.
In the first case, the money in the temporary account is booked to the firm’s demand deposit
account with the same bank (see Table 5). This is purely a transformation on the liability side of
the loan initiating bank, not affecting its actual reserves in any way. It does however affect the
excess reserves by a small amount, since the bank has to cover the new deposits. Suppose the
reserve requirement were 1 percent, then a new loan of 100 will require 1 unit of reserves. The
new loan of 100 does not change the actual reserves of the bank, since the bank simply increases
the size of its balance sheet on both sides. However, the bank needs to take into account that
loans create deposits, hence it should cover this with reserves by the fraction given by the reserve
requirement. If this were 1 percent, then a new loan of 100 will require 1 unit in reserves, so the
excess reserves will decrease by 1, not by 100.
Hence, in this case, Eqn. (19) is not model consistent, since it assumes that the bank
anticipates a RRR constraint where the excess reserves will decrease by the full amount of 100,
while it actually only decreases by 1. So the bank is acting very cautiously when it assumes the
full amount must be taken into account, and therefore restricts its lending too much.
In the second case, the money in the temporary account gets transferred to the counter-party
bank (see Table 6). This implies a transformation on both the asset and liability sides of the
balance sheets of both banks. The initiating bank reduces its liability side by removing the
tempory account balance, and reduces its assets side by transferring reserves to the counter-
party bank. The counter-party bank increases its liability side by crediting the firm’s demand
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deposit account, and it increases its assets side by receiving the reserves that were transmitted
by the loan-initiating bank.
In this second case, the initiating bank reduces its reserves by the exact amount of the
loan, and the counter-party bank increases its reserves to the total amount of the loan. If we
now consider the effect this has on the excess reserves, then the loan issuing bank was correct
in anticipating that the creation of the new loan would reduce its excess reserves by the full
amount. Hence eqn. (19) is model consistent.
For the counter-party bank, its actual reserves have increased by the full amount of the loan,
hence this also increases its excess reserves. But this bank now has to cover the additional
deposits by additional reserves of 1, so its excess reserves have not actually increased by the full
amount of the loan (100), but only by 99 units.
Summarizing, in case one, the loan-issuing bank does not change its actual reserves, but the
excess reserves decrease by 1 unit, to cover the new deposits. Hence the behavioral assumption
is not model consistent. In case two, the loan-issuing bank reduces its actual reserves by 100,
and excess reserves also decrease by 100. Hence the behavioral assumption is model consistent.
The deposit receiving bank increases its actual reserves by 100, while its excess reserves only
increase by 99, since 1 unit of excess reserves must be reserved to cover the new deposits. In
total, for the banking sector as a whole, the aggregate actual reserves remain unchanged, and
the aggregate excess reserves decrease by 1. But the distribution of the reserves has changed.
In conclusion, if we consider the reserve requirement as an ex ante behavioral constraint, we
are making a conceptual mistake in assuming that the bank anticipates, or believes, that all new
loans will be subtracted from its excess reserves to the full amount, while this would only be true
if all firms borrow from banks that are different than their own bank. We can re-interpret this
assumption by stating that banks always err on the side of caution, and therefore assume the
worst case scenario. The bank does not know in advance what the firm will do with the credit
it obtains, so the best it can do is to assume that the firm will transfer it to another account.
For the CAR constraint a similar reasoning applies. Here the credit risk that a bank computes
is based on the assumption that the loss at default is one hundred percent of the loan, due to
the fact that we have assumed that all loans are non-collateralized debt. The assumption of
a one hundred percent debt write-off is obviously incorrect, since the model specifies a debt
deleveraging of some fraction of the debt. This fraction depends on whether we are dealing with
an insolvency bankruptcy (debt write-off is based on total assets, in order to get positive equity)
or with an illiquidity bankruptcy (debt write-off is based on total debt in order to improve the
debt-to-equity ratio).
The actual loss at default is therefore less than the bank anticipates, so we are always over-
estimating the credit risk when applying the CAR constraint as specified in Eqn. (16). To be
model consistent, that is, to make the anticipated ex ante constraint equivalent to the actual
ex post constraint, we should adjust this equation to the actual debt write-off that would occur
in case of a failure. However, at the moment the bank has to make a decision whether or not
to grant the loan this information is not yet available, hence the bank cannot possibly take this
information into account in the ex ante CAR constraint. Also for the CAR constraint we can
re-interpret this assumption as stating that banks are erring on the side of caution when they
estimate the loss at default.
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Table 5: Loans created when the originating bank (Business Bank B) and the deposit bank (D) are the
same entity.
Business Bank (B) = Deposit Bank (D)
Assets Liabilities
CB reserves Deposits
Loans to firms +100 Temp. account +100
Net Worth
CB reserves Deposits +100
Loans to firms +100 Net Worth
(Excess reserves) -1
Table 6: Loans created in an overdraft system: clearing by the central bank through the reserve system.
Business Bank (B) Deposit Bank (D)
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
CB reserves Deposits CB reserves Deposits
Loans to firms +100 Temp. account +100 Loans to firms Net Worth
Net Worth
CB reserves Deposits CB reserves Deposits +100
Loans to firms +100 Funds owed to Bank D
+100
Loans to firms Net Worth
Net Worth Advances made to
bank B +100
CB reserves -100 Deposits CB reserves +100 Deposits +100
Loans to firms +100 Net Worth Loans to firms Net Worth
(Excess reserves) -100 (Excess reserves) +99
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B Appendix: Recession Analysis
The analysis in Section 4 shows boxplots for the amplitude of recessions. In order to detect such
amplitudes, a recession has to be a well-defined statistical object, and an algorithm is needed
to detect when a recession starts and when it ends. The algorithm that was used to obtain the
results for this paper is based on well-established methods from the empirical literature, such as
in Claessens et al. (2011). For business cycles we use the terms expansion (recession) to indicate
an increase (decrease) in output, measured by sales in units (real GDP). For financial cycles
the corresponding terms are upturn (downturn) for an increase (decrease) in total private sector
debt, measured in terms of total firm credit.
B.1 Terminology and Definitions
The meaning of the statistics are the same as in Claessens et al. (2011).
- All statistics correspond to batch means.
- The determination of peaks and throughs is based on output.
- Duration of a recession is the number of quarters between peak and through.
- Duration for recoveries is the time it takes to attain the level of the previous peak (in quarters).
- The statistics ”amplitude” and ”slope” are based on sales (in units).
- The amplitude for a recession is the decline in sales during the peak to through decline.
- The amplitude of recoveries is the change in sales from the through level to the level reached
in the first four quarters of an expansion.
- Cumulative loss is the combination of duration and amplitude and measures the cost of reces-
sions as the foregone output that was not produced (it is calculated as an integral above
the output curve).
- The slope of recession is the amplitude divided by duration. The slope of a recovery is the
amplitude from the through to the period when sales reach the level of the last peak,
divided by duration.
The following definitions are taken from Claessens et al. (2011, p.10-12):
Peaks and troughs A peak in a timeseries yt occurs at time t if there are 2 periods of increase
before, and 2 periods of increase after t:
(y[t]− y[t− 2] > 0, y[t]− y[t− 1] > 0) and (y[t+ 2]− y[t] < 0, y[t+ 1]− y[t] < 0) (20)
A trough in a timeseries yt occurs at time t if:
(y[t]− y[t− 2] < 0, y[t]− y[t− 1] < 0) and (y[t+ 2]− y[t] > 0, y[t+ 1]− y[t] > 0)) (21)
Recession A recession/downturn is the period between a peak a trough.
Expansion An expansion/upturn is the period between a trough and a peak.
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Recovery A recovery is the early part of the expansion phase, defined as the time it takes for
output to rebound from the trough to the peak level before the recession.
Duration of recession The duration of a recession/downturn is the number of quarters, k,
between a peak (y0) and the next trough (yk) of a variable.
Duration of recovery The duration of a recovery/upturn is the number of quarters (r) it
takes for a variable to reach its previous peak level after the trough: {r > k : yr ≥ y0}.
Amplitude for recession The amplitude of a recession/downturn Ac, measures the change
in yt from a peak (y0) to the next trough (yk): Ac = yk − y0
Amplitude for recovery The amplitude of a recovery/upturn, Au, measures the change in yt
from a trough to the level reached in the first four quarters of an expansion (yk+4): Au = yk+4yk.
Slope for recession The slope of a recession/downturn is the ratio of the amplitude to the
duration of the recession/downturn: Sc = Ac/Dc.
Slope for recovery The slope of a recovery/upturn is the ratio of the change of a variable
from the trough to the quarter at which it attains its last peak divided by the duration: Sr =
(yr − y0)/Du.
Cumulative loss for recession The cumulative loss for a recession with duration k combines
the duration and amplitude as a measure for the overall costs of recession: F c =
∑k
j=1(yj −
y0)−Ac/2, where y0 is the level of output at the start of the recession, and yj are the successive
terms during the recession.
B.2 Detecting peaks and troughs
Fig.11 shows the detection of peaks and troughs in the time series of output for the business
cycle (Panel a) and for the time series of total debt for the financial cycle (Panel c). Fig.11
(Panel b) shows expansions and recessions from peak to trough for the business cycle. This plot
does not coincide exactly with the peaks and troughs detected in Fig.11 (a) due to the fact that
sometimes two peaks can follow each other without having a through in the middle. This is
because the through does not necessarily signal a recession, since it might be too short. In such
cases the event is censored, i.e. removed from the plot. Fig.11 (c-d) provides the same type
of analysis for the credit cycle. Here the solid lines coincide with peaks in the credit cycle, i.e.
with the start of a downturn. Dotted lines indicate throughs in the credit cycle, i.e. the start of
an upturn or recovery.
B.3 Statistical properties of business and financial cycles
Figure 12 shows statistical properties for the duration of the business cycle, in terms of density
plots for the duration of recessions and recoveries. The duration of recessions is bi-modal, with
modes at 3 and 6 quarters, resp. The duration of recoveries is also bi-modal, but with modes at
1.5 and 5.5 quarters, resp. Similarly, Figure 13 shows statistical properties for the duration of
the financial cycle, using density plots for the duration of upturns and downturns in the total
45
(a) Business cycle, peaks and throughs
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
60
00
65
00
70
00
75
00
80
00
85
00
90
00
Peaks and troughs
Quarters
O
ut
pu
t
(b) Business cycle, recessions and
expansions
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
60
00
65
00
70
00
75
00
80
00
85
00
90
00
Recessions and expansions
Quarters
O
ut
pu
t
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(d) Credit cycle, downturns and recoveries
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Figure 11: Peaks and troughs for the business cycle and the financial cycle, for 500 months (167 quarters).
Solid lines: peaks, or start of a recession; dotted lines: troughs, or start of an expansion. (a-c) Detection of
peaks and throughs. (b-d) Recessions and expansions (for the business cycle), and upturns and downturns
(for the financial cycle).
debt. The density of the duration of downturns has a mode at 12 quarters, while the density of
recoveries shows a mode at 1 quarter.
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Figure 12: Density plots for the duration of recessions and recoveries along the business cycle.
Financial cycle properties
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Figure 13: Density plots for the duration of downturns and recoveries along the financial cycle.
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Notes
1Most Central Banks do not vary the reserve requirement ratio all too often. However, the People’s Bank of
China (PBOC) uses it as a main policy tool for banking regulation.
2Speech by Governor Jeremy C. Stein from the FED, held at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
on October 11, 2012: Evaluating Large-Scale Asset Purchases, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/
stein20121011a.htm, retrieved on Feb. 15, 2015.
3Alan Greenspan, 11 July 2012, CNBC News Interview, http://www.cnbc.com/id/48155262, retrieved on Feb.
15, 2015.
4Mario Draghi, President of the ECB, Frankfurt am Main, 22 January 2015, Introductory statement to the
press conference on the ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme. http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/
2015/html/is150122.en.html, retrieved on Feb. 15, 2015.
5EIB website, Investment Plan for Europe, http://www.eib.org/about/invest-eu/index.htm, retrieved on Feb.
15, 2015.
6The generic term ”investment good” is used to denote machinery and other physical capital goods.
7All parameter values are listed in Table 4. They result from extensive model calibrations to match empirical
stylized facts, as documented in Dawid et al. (2012) and Dawid et al. (2015).
8The specification of the probability of default depends on the internal risk model of the banks. The Basel
II Accord specifies that banks should use an objective ratings-based risk-model, i.e. similar to the models used
by ratings agencies, i.e. Moody’s, Fitch and Standard & Poor’s. Our specification follows Moody’s KMV model,
which incorporates the Vasicek-Kealhofer (VK) Model (Vasicek, 1984; Kealhofer, 2003). An important assumption
in this model is that there exists only one source of market risk, and this is the only risk factor affecting all firms,
for example the aggregate state of the economy. The KMV model is part of the class of structural models, in
contrast to the class of reduced models.
9A similar specification for the interest rate rule can be found in Delli Gatti et al. (2011, p. 67). The difference
with our specification is that we use the probability of default, while they use the leverage ratio.
10An alternative behavioural rule for the bank that we have tested is ”partial rationing”: when the credit risk
exceeds the risk exposure budget V b, then firm i only receives a proportion of its request, up to the constraint.
This rule implies that banks always exhaust their available risk budget and does not result in a viable economy. It
leads to more credit rationing rather than less, since firms coming to the bank after a very risky firm has already
secured a loan will not be able to receive any loans, because the bank has already exhausted its risk budget.
11Note that here we use ”partial rationing” for the RRR, while for the CAR we use ”full rationing”.
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